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"Failure to offset the continued shrinkage 
of the value of the nation's monetary unit through 
compensating investment measures in the management of 
the Permanent Funds will impose an ever-increasing 
burden on the taxpayers of the State, for the mounting 
loss of real income received by the beneficiary in­
stitutions from their invested endowments will require 
an offsetting increase in legislative appropriations 
for institutional maintenance. The hazards of an 
aggressive program of investment in growth equities 
are no greater, it should be recognized, than the 
predictable loss that will be incurred through failure 
to adopt adequate counterinflationary measures in its 
long-range investment planning."
Edmund H. Kase, Jr., "The New 
Mexico State Investment Council- 
Five Years in Retrospect," New 
Mexico Business (August 196^), p. 7.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem
Few if any state and local government trust funds 
are able to obtain the maximum yield on their investments 
because of out-of-date regulations, a lack of professional 
management, poor choices of investment media, or a combina­
tion of these problems.^ In the investment environment, "a 
dollar not made is as bad as a dollar lost. Therefore, 
negative inaction on the part of a manager is as costly as 
reckless action. In fact in the history of the American 
pension fund, inaction (disguised under the ambiguous term
conservatism) has been far more costly than reckless invest- 
2ment." Even if the cause of management's inaction is out- 
of-date regulation, only the blame is shifted. The costliness 
remains.
The trend toward updating regulations and hiring 
professionals to manage state investments has indeed been 
slow, although the number of states authorizing the purchase
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly. W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair­
man. (Helena, Montana* McKee Printing, 196^.) pp. 9 - 1 1»
2Sidney Homer, "Bond Investment Policy for Pension 
Funds," C.F.A. Readings in Financial Analvsis. (Homewood,
1 1 1.* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I970.) p. 6 2 8.
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of common stock has increased from 28 in i960 to 42 in 
1970.^ As shown in Chapter IV, most states still place 
some sort of restriction on the amount of the fund which 
can he so invested. Montana has not as yet joined the trend 
toward liberalization of investment regulation. Similarly, 
the desirability of professional management of state invest­
ments has been indicated in numerous state studies dating 
back at least to i960, but it was not until I97I that a
hprofessional was employed. Still another apparent problem 
concerning the state's investment management has been the 
poor choice of investment media available and authorized.
For example, why should a municipal security yielding 3.5 
percent have been purchased if a government bond yielding 
4 .0  percent was available at that time.^ The topic of this 
paper will be to analyze these problems as they have affected 
the three largest state trust funds in Montana and to recom­
mend methods for improving the yields obtained.
Objectives of the Paper
The specific objectives of this paper are to analyze 
the portfolio management of the Trust and Legacy Fund,
^National Association of State Retirement Adminis­
trators, Survey of State Retirement Systems, (June 30» 1 9 7 0).
^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair­
man, (Helena, Montana: McKee Printing, 1 964), p. 7 *
^Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial 
Reports. (Butte, Montana: Allied Printing, i960 - 1970).
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Teachers* Retirement Fund, and the Public Employee Retire­
ment Fund in terms of return on investment. Using the values 
for assets and interest as reported in the biennial reports 
of the funds, the growth of assets, the annual interest, and 
a hypothetical common stock growth are presented in the var­
ious performance summaries. This data is presented in terms 
of both actual and i960 dollars to compensate for the effects 
of inflation. A summary of the more recent studies made in 
1964 and 1970 is also presented along with a summary of the 
regulation and management changes made as a result of these 
studies. Finally, recommendations are made for correcting 
remaining deficiencies. Throughout the paper, the specific 
losses in revenue due to the problems noted is emphasized.
Chapter II is a summary of the regulatory background 
as well as the performance summary for each of the funds.
In the introduction to the chapter, the methods for comput­
ing the hypothetical growth for a common stock invested fund 
is presented including tables showing the conversions neces­
sary to obtain the constant dollar index and the common stock 
growth- index.
CHAPTER II 
FUND SUMMARY 
Introduction
An historical background along with a performance 
summary of each of the three major funds is presented in 
Chapter II. The historical background includes a brief 
summary of the statutory and constitutional regulations 
governing each fund, a statement of the purpose of each 
fund, and a look at the more pressing investment return 
problems. The performance analysis consists mainly of a 
graph of the growth of the various fund's assets and the 
asset growth in terms of i960 dollars, the interest earned 
each year and the interest in terms of i960 dollars, and 
finally, a hypothetical growth which could have been 
attained had the fund been invested 100 percent in common 
stock. This hypothetical growth is also presented in terms 
of i960 dollars.
In order to deflate the various performance measures
and the hypothetical growth from equity investments, an index
was established using the consumer price index as reported in
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Using the figures as reported
in the FRB, a new index was established with i960, the base
year, equal to 1 .0 0. The actual index as reported and the
4
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converted index are shown in Table 1 . As indicated, the 
purchasing power of the I96O dollar declined by some 30 per­
cent during the 10 years covered by this study. To obtain 
the final deflated or constant values for the reported asset, 
interest, or common stock values, the reported figure was 
divided by the converted index value for that year.
TABLE 1
ACTUAL AND CONVERTED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Year Actual* Converted
i960 88.7 1.00
1961 89.6 1.01
1962 90.6 1.02
1963 91.7 1.03
1964 92.9 1 .0 4
1963 94.5 1.06
1966 97.2 1.09
1967 100.0 1.13
1968 1 04 .2 1.17
1969 109.8 1 .2 4
1970 116.3 1.31
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, No. 1 2, Vol. 5 7>
(October 1971)» p. A-68.
*base year = 1967
To obtain a hypothetical yield for a fund invested 
100 percent in common stock, the asset value for each fund 
in i960 was used as a starting figure. Next an index based 
on the Standard and Poors 5OO stock average was established.
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The actual and converted indices are shown in Table 2 , As 
is indicated by the figures, after rising to a peak value of 
1.77 (i960 = 1 .0 0), the final 1970 stock price would be 1*50 
times the I96O base or approximately a 50 percent gain over 
10 years. In addition the stocks paid average dividends for 
the period that ranged from a high of 3.83 percent to a low 
of 3.00 percent. In calculating the total growth of asset 
value, however, a constant figure of 3.00 percent was used. 
This tends to give a more conservative return than had the 
actual amounts been used.
TABLE 2
ACTUAL AND CONVERTED STOCK PRICE INDEX
Year Actual* Converted
i960 55.85 1.00
1961 66.27 1.19
1962 62.38 1.12
1963 69.87 1.25
1964 8 1 .3 7 1 .46
1965 88.17 1.59
1966 85.26 1.53
1967 91.93 1.65
1968 98.70 1.77
1969 9 7 .8 4 1.75
1970 83.22 1.50
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, No. 1 2, Vol. 579
(October, I971), p. A-65.
*base year = 1950
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An example of the calculations used to compute the
hypothetical asset value for each year is as follows*
Asset value 196I = asset value in i960 multiplied 
by the dividend rate multiplied by the stock price 
index.
Thus for 1961, the projected growth in asset value for the
Trust and Legacy Fund was calculated as follows*
$44,278,000 X 1.03 X 1.19 = $54,271,545 (asset value 
in 1961)
To deflate this value, the results were divided by the con­
sumer price index of I96I which was 1 .0 1. This gave the 
purchasing power of the I96I projected value in terms of 
i960 constant dollars.
These formulas were applied to each of the funds to 
determine constant values and the hypothetical growth of 
each fund if it had been invested in common stock. The funds 
needed to have performed only as well as the averages to have 
obtained the growth hypothesised.
Montana Trust and Legacy Fund
"In 1924, 18 sections were added to the Montana 
Constitution as Article XXI. Apparently, the main purpose 
of this article, which created the Montana Trust and Legacy 
Fund, was to establish a unified system for investing perma­
nent funds, and to provide machinery for the acceptance of 
gifts and donations to the s t a t e . T h e  state Board of Land
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair- 
man, (Helena, Montana % McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 4 ,
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Commissioners was empowered to manage the Trust and Legacy 
Fund in accordance with Constitutional and state statute reg­
ulations. Specifically, this regulation was found in sections 
79-1201 and 1202, and 81-1001 through 81-1008.
The Trust and Legacy Fund consists of the permanent
school fund and all other public funds of the state subject
to long-term investment not legally in the custody of any
lawfully constituted board or the investment of which has not
2been designated by statute. Interest earned on the fund’s 
investments are credited pro rata to the various accounts 
which make up the fund.
The broad purpose of the fund is to provide revenues 
through the investment of permanent funds for the use of the 
state's public schools. These revenues supplement the funds 
generated through taxation to support the public school sys­
tem. The per-student allocation of revenue from the Trust 
and Legacy Fund for the years i960 through 1970 is shown in 
Table 3. Although the average annual cost of educating each 
student in the state was reported to be $822.00 in 1970* some 
communities only spent around $2 70.0 0.^ Thus, although the 
degree of benefit varies greatly from community to community, 
all areas do benefit significantly from the investment income 
of this fund. Obviously, if this income could be increased, 
both students and taxpayers would benefit.
2Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports. (Butte, Montana: Allied Printing, I968), p. 2
^"Financing America’s Scb 
Report. November I5* 1971* P* 6 0.
hools," U.S. News & World
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TABLE 3
PER-STUDENT ALLOCATION FROM TRUST 
AND LEGACY FUND INCOME
Year Allocation
196 0 .............................................$19 .89
196 1 .................  19.55
196 2 .......................................  2 0 .6 3
196 3 .......................................  21 .3 5
196 4 .................  22 .8 2
196 5 ................. 23.87
196 6 .......................................  2 2 .8 8
196 7 ................  25.87
196 8 .......................................  3 4 .6 7
196 9 ...............  40.17
197 0 ...............  34.10
Source* Department of State Lands and Investments,
Biennial Reports, (Butte, Montana* Allied
Printing, 1 970), p. 4 .
Since the return on investment for the Trust and 
Legacy Fund is the lowest of the three funds being studied, 
there is little doubt that the yield could be improved. The
main problem appears to be the restrictive regulation of
investing for the Trust and Legacy Fund. This regulation, 
section 81-1001 of the state statues, permits the fund to 
invest only in general obligations bonds of the state such 
as school district bonds, county and municipal bonds, bonds 
of the state of Montana, and United States government bonds. 
All of these investment media have had lower yields than the 
corporate bonds authorized for purchase by the Teachers* and
10
IIPublic Employee Retirement Funds. The need to liberalize 
the investment regulations of this fund has been pointed out 
numerous times in past studies, but no changes have as yet 
been made,^
Failing to choose the highest yielding security 
available has also apparently been a problem in the past 
which has caused yields to be lower than necessary. The 
purchases of the Trust and Legacy Fund for the years I96O 
through 1970 are shown in Table 4 . To understand the reason 
that these investments in municipal bonds were not in keeping 
with the concept of maximizing return, note the difference in 
return between government bonds and municipals as shown in 
Table 5 « These figures support the hypothesis that the pur­
chase of municipal bonds invariably produced lower income 
than the corresponding government bonds.
On the surface, it appeared that the problem of 
overly conservative investment selection had ended in 19&5 
when the purchases of municipal bonds ended. An analysis of 
the fund's biennial reports, however, indicated that this was 
not the case. For example, in the I969-7O report, it was 
noted that the fund purchased almost I.3 million dollars 
worth of U. S. Treasury notes with coupon rates over 7.0
^Moody's Investor Service, January 1 1, 1971*
^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair­
man, (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1964), pp. 37 
and 38.
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percent with maturities in the mid-seventies. During this 
same time period, another two million was invested in Federal 
Land Bank bonds with coupon rates of slightly over 5 *0 per­
cent and maturities again in the mid-seventies.^ There was 
no indication of whether these Land Bank bonds were purchased 
at a discount, however, and this factor could have accounted 
for part of the large gap in yields.
TABLE 4
TRUST AND LEGACY FUND PURCHASES, I96O - 1970
Year
Amount
Government
Bonds
Amount
Municipal
Bonds
i960 $1 ,382 ,000 $1,709,800
1961 3,750,000 994,0001962 1 ,800 ,0 00 694,000
1963 2,300,000 383,0001964 1 ,0 00 ,0 00 952,000
1965 2,453,000 4 0 0 ,0 0 01966 2 ,339 ,000 none
1967 2,961,000 none1968 2,303,000 none
1969 2 ,9 0 8 ,0 00 none
1970 2,970,000 none
Source: Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports (Butte, Mt.i Allied Printing, i960 - 1 9 7 0).
^Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial 
Reports (Butte, Mt.: Allied Printing, I96O - I97O).
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TABLE 5
YIELDS ON MUNICIPAL BONDS, MEDIUM TERM, AND 
LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS, I96O - I965
Year Municipals
Government 
Medium Term
Government 
Long Term
i960 3.60# 4.75% 4.23#
1961 3.60 3.60 3.75
1962 3.25 3.50 4 .0 0
1963 3.30 3.75 4 .1 0
1964 3.30 4.00 4 .1 0
1965 3 .4 0 4.25 4.25
Source : Moody's Investor Service
Another reason for the overly conservative investment 
policies of the fund stemmed from the fact that the portfolio 
manager for the fund accomplished the investment function as 
a side-line to his regular job. He had no training in invest­
ments nor were there any apparent guidelines for him to fol­
low in choosing investments. This problem like the problem 
of too strict regulation of the fund's investments was pointed 
out by past studies of the state's investment policies.^ Un­
like the regulatory problem which has not been corrected, the 
hiring of a professional investment manager under the Execu­
tive Reorganization plan may eliminate the problem of manage­
ment of the fund. Reorganization is discussed in Chapter III.
^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair- 
man (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1964), pp. 3 - 4 .
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The performance summary of the Trust and Legacy 
Fund is shown in Figure 1 . Using the values for assets and 
interest as reported in the biennial reports of the fund, 
the growth of assets, the annual interest, and a hypothetical 
common stock growth curve are shown in terms of actual and 
i960 dollars. The effect of inflation can thus be demon­
strated. As is indicated on the graph, the Trust and Legacy 
Fund lost approximately $23 million during the 10 year period 
i960 through 1970 by not being allowed to invest in common 
stock. Moreover to attain the results indicated on the graph, 
the management of the fund would have had to produce average 
results since the hypothetical curve is based on the Standard 
and Poors 500 stock index, using the procedures outlined in 
the introduction to this chapter.
When inflation is considered, the asset value of the 
fund grew very little over the 10 year period. In addition, 
the interest earnings on the fund remained almost constant. 
These results are very discouraging in light of the tremen­
dous increase in yields available during this period. When 
it is not possible to take advantage of the opportunities 
available due to regulatory limitations, however, the perfor­
mance of the fund is bound to suffer. Hopefully, the need to 
liberalize the investment regulation of the fund is evident.
14
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Teachers* Retirement Fund
The Teachers* Retirement System was created by 
section 75-2702 of the Montana Statutes. The Retirement 
Fund was established under section 75-2708 of that statute 
and was administered by the system's board of administration 
created under section 75-2703. Investment authority for the 
fund was delegated to the Board of Land Commissioners as 
part of the Long Term Investment Fund of the State.
"The Teachers* Retirement System exists to improve 
the educational system of the state by providing financial 
income to teachers who are retired by reason of service or 
disability and to provide survivor benefits if the teacher
odies before retirement." In order to do this, contributions 
are collected from both employer and employee and invested 
according to section 79-1202 of the statutes. This statute 
provided for considerably more liberal investments than for 
the Trust and Legacy Fund since the Teachers* Retirement 
System could have invested in VA and FHA mortgages and 
corporate bonds which were forbidden to the Trust and Legacy 
Fund. Thus, it was not surprising that the Teachers* Fund 
outperformed the Trust and Legacy Fund in terms of percentage 
growth in asset value and return on investment.
oThe Teachers* Retirement System of the State of 
Montana, Biennial Reports (Helena, Mt.: The Teachers*
Retirement System, i960 - 7 0), p, 2 .
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There was reason to believe that the fund could 
still have done better than it did, however. First, some 
investments apparently were made more conservatively than 
required by the statutes. In addition, as was indicated by 
the Standard and Poors growth index in the introduction to 
this chapter, common stock sustained greater yields for the 
10 year period being analyzed than did any other type of 
investments. Since the fund was not allowed to invest in 
common stock, greater returns could probably have been gained.
The overly conservative investment of the fund has 
been concealed somewhat because of the relatively high return 
that has been earned. One example of this overly conservative 
problem has been the preference of the fund for long term 
government bonds over medium term even though the yield for 
medium term has been much greater for the period being con­
sidered. As in the case of the Trust and Legacy Fund, the 
purchase price of the security was not listed in the fund's 
annual report. Thus, actual yields may differ from the coupon 
rates quoted.
The amount of money lost by not allowing investment 
in common stock is approximated in Figure 2 . In addition 
asset growth in terms of actual and constant i960 dollars 
and interest income in terms of actual and constant dollars 
is presented. Although the Teachers' Fund did better than 
the Trust and Legacy Fund, its performance could also have 
been improved.
17
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Public Employee Retirement Fund
The Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) was 
established in 19^5 and was governed by sections 68-101 
through 68-1320 of the state statutes. The retirement fund 
was created under section 68-405 and was managed by a board 
of administration of the system until this function was 
transferred to the state Board of Investments in August of
1971.
The purpose of the fund is to provide retirement 
benefits to public employees of the State of Montana as 
determined by the statutes and the Board of Administration 
of the fund. As in the case of the Teachers* Retirement 
Fund, contributions are collected from both employee and 
employer and retirement can be taken after 10 years of 
service to the state and upon reaching the age of 65. In 
addition, disability benefits are paid when the employee is 
prevented from working because of injury or disease arising 
out of or in the course of employment.
As stated, the organization currently responsible 
for investing the fund is the State Board of Investments. 
Previously, however, the state Land Board was designated 
as the responsible agency. Recognizing the lack of profes­
sional investment management in the Land Board department, 
the Board of Administration of PERS did all of the actual 
investing and sought retroactive approval from the Land 
Board most of the time. The total investments of the fund
19
as of January 1, 1971 were $5 9*000 ,000 with the fund invested 
approximately 50 percent in public utility bonds, 36 percent 
in mortgages, and 14 percent in miscellaneous government 
securities. 9
Like the other two funds, there was evidence of 
overly conservative investment of the PERS funds. Purchases 
by type of security that the fund's management made for the 
past 10 years are shown in Table 6. It appears from looking 
at the table that the management was more interested in 
either diversification or in local investment than in max­
imizing return. The rates of return for the various sec­
urities listed are given in Table 8 and Figures 10 and 1 1.
It is apparent that the highest return for this period was 
obtainable in corporate bonds, mortgages, government medium 
term bonds, government long term bonds, and municipals, in 
that order. Thus no investments should have been made in 
the lower categories.
The performance summary of the Trust and Legacy Fund 
is shown in Figure 3. The asset growth, the annual interest 
and the hypothetical growth for a 100 percent common stock 
fund in terms of actual and constant dollars are shown.
Again it is obvious that the fund would have performed better 
had it been invested in common stock. The fund did perform 
much better than the Trust and Legacy Fund, however, probably
^Public Employees' Retirement System, Comparative 
Financial Statements (Helena, Mt.1 Public Employee Retire­
ment System, I96O - I97O).
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because of the more liberal investment regulation. Much 
like the Teachers* Fund, the PERS fund was more able to 
counter the effects of inflation by purchasing securities 
with higher yields.
TABLE 6
PERS INVESTMENTS, I96I - I97O
Year
Government
Bonds
Municipal
Bonds Mortgages
Corporate
Bonds
1961 50 295 3.369 none
1962 1 ,3 4 8 218 2,363 none
1963 2,536 91 2,202 1,685
1964 4 ,4 1 2 none 2,725 6,620
1965 3,576 none 3,474 3,363
1966 4,490 none 3,474 2 ,6 4 2
1967 3 ,5 5 3 none 2,794 3,100
1968 5,332 none 1,120 7,037
1969 ** ** ** **
1970 1 ,6 4 8 none 2,439 4,850
Source : Public Employees* Retirement System, 
Financial Statements (Helena. Mt.;
Comparative 
Public Employee
Retirement System, i960 - 1970).
** Information unavailable
21
4.00
■Common Stock Projection
Common Stock Projection 
Constant Dollars
Asset
Growth
2*00 m
/ 3 ^Interestilncome
ÿlAsset Growth-
Interest Income- --.uoiiars ^Constant Dollars
1.00
i960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 I970
(Years)
Fig. 3.— Public Employee Retirement Fund Performance
22
Summary
The three largest funds of the state have had differ­
ent problems in the area of regulatory investment authoriza­
tion, but somewhat similar problems in the areas of management 
and conservative choice of securities. All of these funds 
would have benefitted by more liberal investment regulations 
and by professional management of their assets. In addition, 
they would have had greater returns if their managers had 
merely selected the highest yielding securities available to 
them at the time. The facts that are shown in this chapter 
are, that considerable revenues were lost by not allowing 
more aggressive and more professional management of the 
state's investments. To compound this problem, the state 
has been aware of the actions necessary for at least 10 years 
and has only begun to take the needed actions to correct the 
deficiencies noted by previous studies.
The summary of past studies of the investment of 
state funds is presented in Chapter III. These studies 
include the 196^ Montana Legislative Report #l4 , the 1970 
Report on Reorganization and the resultant Reorganization 
Act which established the State Board of Investments.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STATE INVESTMENT POLICIES
Introduction
Recognition of most of the existing deficiencies in 
the state investment program dates hack at least to i960 when 
the Legislative Council noted that "until experienced invest­
ment personnel are employed by the state, little can be done 
to increase the return on the state's investments."^ No 
action was forthcoming, however, as a result of the 1964  
study and the existing deficiencies were allowed to continue. 
Again in 1964, the Legislative Council prepared an extensive
report on the need for updating the state's investment pro- 
2gram. This report also brought about little change in the 
state's program. Finally, after another investigation was 
made as part of the Executive Reorganization study conducted 
in 1970,^ the State Board of Investments was established and 
a professional manager was hired to monitor the investment of 
all state funds.
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assemblv. W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair* 
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 9.
^Ibid.
Report of the Montana Commission on Reorganization 
to the Forty-Second Legislative Assemblv. Governor Forrest H, 
Anderson, Chairman (Helena, Mt.* McKee Printing, I970).
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Montana Legislative Council Report No. 1 4,
December, 1964
Three major deficiencies in the state investment
program were noted in the 1964 study. First, the need to
allow investment in common stock in order to improve yields
and maintain the purchasing power of the assets of the state
4funds was pointed out. The fact that 28 states already 
allowed investment in common stock to some degree with a 
trend toward liberalizing investment statutes was noted in 
the study. The Council recommended that as soon as a pro­
fessional investment manager could be hired, "the Constitu­
tion be amended to remove the barriers against investing 
the Trust and Legacy Fund and other funds in common stock 
and other corporate obligations."^
The second major deficiency noted in the study was 
the lack of a state investment office with a professional 
investment officer to manage the state's investments.^ The 
Council noted that none of the personnel currently doing the 
investing had any professional experience nor did they work 
at the investing function full-time. The 1953 "Unified 
Investment Plan" was obviously not working since each fund
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assemblv, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair­
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 3 7.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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was managing its own investments and was getting rubber stamp 
approval at most from the Land Board. Diverse investment 
procedures and programs had developed and much duplication 
of effort was noted. Thus, the Council recommended that a 
separate state agency be established called the State Invest­
ment Council consisting of five members appointed by the 
governor. 7 This Council would also include members from 
both the Teachers* and Public Employee Retirement Systems.
The council felt that the establishment of an Investment 
Council would eliminate the problems noted above.
Third, the study's authors were quite critical of 
the fund's record keeping, particularly the Trust and Legacy 
Fund. "Diverse accounting methods are employed by three of 
the agencies; the records of the Department of Lands and In-
o
vestments are hopelessly inadequate." This same deficiency 
in the records o*f the Department of Lands and Investments 
was also cited in the i960 study, but apparently no action 
was taken to improve the system. The Legislative Council 
felt that the creation of a centralized investment office 
would also eliminate this problem.
Again however, nothing was done to correct the pro­
blems cited. As in i960, a well prepared, thorough report 
on major problems in the investment of the state's trust 
funds was ignored. This failure to act has cost the state
26
at least 35 million dollars in lost revenue over the years 
i960 - 1970, as shown in Chapter II. Finally when the 
Reorganization Plan for investments was implemented, the 
state began to take action on the deficiencies noted in 
i960 and again in 1964 in the area of state investments.
The Report on Executive Reorganization
Project No. Montana P-4 4, Executive Reorganization, 
again noted the same deficiencies in the state investment 
program that had been pointed out in i960 and 1964. This 
study made a plea mainly for the establishment of a central­
ized investment office as part of the executive reorganiza­
tion program and did not deal much with the need to update 
the investment regulations, a legislative problem. The need 
for professional investments personnel to manage the invest­
ment program and the need to centralize the decision making 
and record keeping functions was pointed out in the study.^
In the study it was stated that "the decentralization 
of administration and lack of qualified investment personnel 
make the investment process inefficient and it is difficult 
to accurately determine exactly where the state's money is 
and the rate of r e t u r n . T h i s  problem was evident when
^Report of the Montana Commission on Executive 
Reorganization to the Forty-Second Legislative Assemblv, 
Governor Forrest H. Anderson, Chairman (Helena, Mt.* McKee 
Printing, 1 9 7 0), p. 59
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the varied investment practices of the state's three major 
trust funds were studied. The 1953 Unified Investment Plan 
failed because the Teachers' and Public Employee Retirement 
Funds were unwilling to yield the management of their invest­
ment functions to the Land Board. This would most likely not 
have happened if the Land Board had hired a professional to 
manage the investments for which the Land Board was given 
responsibility under the plan. This diffusion of investing 
responsibility that has developed undoubtedly has led to dup­
lication of offices, records, accounting, and personnel. Thus 
the study recommended that "the investment of retirement funds
ought to be centralized with the investment of all state funds
11under a qualified staff of investment specialists."
Reorganization of the Executive Department 
Investments
The result of the project study on reorganization 
was the passage of Senate Bill 2 7 4, "State Reorganization of 
the Executive Department." The State Board of Investments 
which was activated by executive order August 2 0, I97I was 
a result of this bill. The Board is composed of five members 
appointed by the Governor with experience and knowledge in 
the field of investments. In addition, the Board has hired 
an investment manager with experience as a former brokerage 
firm Vice-President. Under the reorganization plan, the
p. 67.
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Board has sole authority to exercise the investment functions 
transferred to it and no other agency may invest state funds. 
Members of both the Teachers' and Public Employee Retirement 
Systems are members of the Board of Investments, however, and 
may presumably advise the investment officer. The Board is 
required to continue investing under the current regulations 
and may veto any proposed investments under its jurisdiction.
Summary
"The major deficiencies existing in the state's
investment program are the same as they have been for the
12past 20 years." This statement from the 1970 study on 
reorganization was a concise explanation of the situation in 
Montana prior to the establishment of the Board of Investments 
this past summer. Numerous times the need for updated regula­
tion, for hiring professional management, and for centralizing 
investing authority had been pointed out. Yet the problems 
have persisted and have still not been completely solved.
The state cannot expect the new investment officer to obtain 
the best possible yields on the assets of the various trust 
funds unless he is given more freedom in selecting the in­
vestment media. Standardized regulation for all of the state 
funds should be set up. With the establishment of a central­
ized investment office, many problems should be overcome. 
Others such as updating regulations must still be overcome.
p. 39.
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Recommendations for improving the yield on state 
investments are made in Chapter IV. Foremost of these is 
the need to allow investment in common stock. Other recom­
mendations are in the area of investments either now being 
made or that have been made in the past, namely mortgages 
and municipal bonds.
CHAPTER IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Case for Common Stock Investment
The question of equity investment should concern all 
trust fund managers and legislators in light of the higher 
yields obtainable on these securities. The 1964 Legislative 
Council report on investments stated that 28 states already 
allowed investment in common stock and the trend was toward 
more and more liberal investment laws. Today at least 42 
states allow investment in common stock.^ Governments are 
rapidly realizing that the only way to maintain the purchasing 
power of their assets is to provide their investment managers 
with the freedom to choose the highest yielding securities 
available with reasonable safety of principle. This includes 
allowing the purchase of high-grade equities.
Just how much revenue the state has lost by not allow­
ing investment in common stock can only be estimated, but the 
investment yields in almost every state whose laws were changed
to permit investment in common stock have increased when growth
2as well as dividends was included. An example of the growth
^National Association of State Retirement Administra­
tors, Survey of State Retirement Systems, (June 30, 1970).
2Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair- 
man (Helena, Mt.i McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 35
30
31
factor was evident in an analysis of the Wisconsin Retirement 
Fund. That fund was divided into two sections so that the 
performance of the fund could be more easily analyzed. The 
overall interest earned for the fund was 4 percent, only 
slightly below the average of Montana's funds.^ The equities 
portion of the fund, however, which makes up approximately 
50 percent of all assets had the following percent growth 
during the period 19&3 through 1969*
TABLE 7
GROWTH RATE OF WISCONSIN RETIREMENT FUND 
COMMON STOCK PORTFOLIO, I96] - 19&9
Year Percent
1963 13.1
1964 17.0
1965 14.5
1966 ( 7.5)
1967 21.0
1968 13.1
1969 ( 5.6)
Source : National Association of State Retirement Admin­
istrators, Survey of State Retirement Systems.
(June 30, 1970), p. 5 7.
When this growth was added in to the interest earned, 
the overall yield for the fund was almost 7 percent or approx­
imately 75 percent higher than for Montana. The average growth
^National Association of State Retirement Adminis­
trators, Survey of State Retirement Systems. (June 30, 1 9 70),
p. 56.
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of the common stock fund for the reported period which in­
cluded two significant declines in the stock market was over 
9*0 percent. If Montana could have increased the return on 
its investments 2 to 3 percent over this period, as much as 
an additional six million dollars per year could have been 
earned. This amount of course depends on both the amount of 
the increase and the size of the fund being invested.
In previous studies done by Montana's Legislature in 
i960 and 1964 on the investment of public funds, it was also 
pointed out that millions of dollars in lost income over the 
years was due to the prohibition against common stock invest­
ment. It was pointed out in each study that their observa­
tions of the past were actually hindsight and similarly, the 
loss of revenues pointed out by this paper are also hind­
sight. What is significant, however, is the fact that each 
time a s»tudy is made, this same method of analysis is able 
to point to a considerable loss of revenue due to the same 
cause. The State must at some time use foresight and autho­
rize the purchase of common stock so that the indicated 
losses in revenue will not continue. Both of the earlier 
studies advocated the authorization to purchase common stock, 
but neither recommendation was adopted. Either through a 
lack of understanding of the needs and structure of trust 
funds or through a lack of understanding of the investment 
function, Montana has lagged behind some 42 other states in 
authorizing trusts to purchase equities. The question is 
thus not whether revenues have been lost but only how much.
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Studies conducted by most states prior to allowing 
investment in common stock as well as the works of many pro­
fessional persons in the area of finance and economics have 
pressed states to allow investment in common stock. Included 
in the list of distinguished contributors to the theory of 
state fund management are Dr. Murray E. Polakoff, Chairman of 
the Economics and Finance Department, Graduate School of Bus­
iness, New York University,^ Dr. Paul L. Howell, Professor of 
Finance, Columbia, University,^ Dr. D. G. Tyndall, Professor of
Business, Berkley,^ and Dr. Peter 0 . Dietz, Professor of Fin-
nance. Northwestern University. As a result, even though state 
and local government pension funds do not rely as heavily as 
private pension funds on common stock investment, a trend to­
ward allowing common stock purchases is evident. From 1964  
to 1970 the number of states allowing common stock purchases 
increased from 28 to at least 4 2, with no information avail­
able for five states. A summary of the states regulations 
is presented in Figure 4 . As shown in the summary, the amounts 
authorized by many states is small which is indicative of the
4Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan­
cial Analysts Journal, (May-June, 1966), pp. 79 - 8 1.
^Paul L. Howell, "Pension Funds and the Capital 
Market," The Journal Of Finance, (May, 1958)» pp. 261 - 2 75*
^D. G. Tyndall, "Investment Decisions for Public 
Pension Funds," California Management Review. (Summer, 1965), 
pp. 27 - 4 0.
^Peter 0 . Dietz, "Pension Fund Investment Perfor­
mance— What Method To Use When," Financial Analysts Journal,
(January-February, I966), pp. 83 - 86.
unfounded worry some legislatures have over common stock as 
an investment media. Almost all state fund managers report 
better yields on their common stock portfolios than on their
ofixed income group.
As shown in some studies, the average difference in 
total yield (interest, dividends, and growth) between common 
stock and mortgages has been around 4 percent over the past 
40 years; between common stock and corporate bonds about 4 .5  
percent; between common stock and government bonds around 5 *5  
percent; and between common stock and municipal bonds over 
6 percent. 9 Furthermore, it was pointed out in these studies 
that there was little additional risk for high grade equities 
compared to other types of investments. In fact, when both 
the business risk as well as the inflationary risk were consid­
ered, there was probably considerably more money "lost" through 
investment in fixed income securities than investing in common 
stock of grade A or better companies.
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair­
man (Helena, Mt.t McKee Printing, December, 1964) p. 1 0.
^Elvo T. Beier, How to Increase the Inyestment Return 
of Pension and Welfare Funds (New York: Dornost Publishing
Co., 19^5 ) p. 1 4.
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EQUITIES PERCENT*
AUTH. AUTH.
Alabama . . . Yes . • 20 . .
Alaska . . . Yes . . 50 . .
Arizona • . . Yes . . 40 . . .
Arkansas . • Yes . .
California . Yes . • 25 . . .Colorado . . Yes . . 30 . . ,
Georgia . . . Yes . . 50 . . .
Hawaii • . . Yes . • .
Idaho . . . . Yes . .
Illinois . . No • .
Indiana . . • Yes . . ,
Iowa . . . . Yes . • 10 . . «
Kansas . . . Yes . . 50 . . a
Kentucky . . Yes . . .
Louisiana . . Yes . • .
Maine . . . . Yes . . •
Maryland . . Yes . . 50 . . .
Massachusetts Yes . . •
Michigan . . Yes . . 25 . . .Minnesota . . Yes . . 45 . • •Mississippi . No . . .
Missouri . . Yes . . •
MONTANA . . . No . . •
Nevada . . . Yes . • .
New Hampshire # # Yes . . .
New Jersey . Yes . . 15 . . .New Mexico . # # Yes . . 75 • . •New York . . Yes . . •
North Carolina Yes . . 15 . . .North Dakota Yes . . 50 . . .
Ohio . . . . Yes . . 35 . . •Oklahoma . . Yes . . .
Oregon • • . Yes . . .
Rhode Island Yes . . .
South Carolina No . . .
South Dakota Yes . . a
Tennessee . . Yes . . 50 . . .
Texas . . . . Yes . . 75 . . .U tah . . . . Yes . . .
Vermont . . . Yes . . 35 . . •Virginia . . Yes . . .
Washington . Yes . . .
West Virginia No . . •
Wisconsin . . Yes . . •
Wyoming . . . No . . .
*The figure in this column is a percent
NOTE * No information available for Conn
REMARKS
None
of any corp* max. 
None
**Limited amounts"
None
None
None
35^ currently 
Prudent man rule 
None
Selected industries
None
None
Prudent man rule 
Prudent man rule 
Prudent man rule 
None
Selected industries
None
None
Corp. bonds auth. 
Prudent man rule 
Corp. bonds auth. 
None
Prudent man rule
None
None
None
None
None
None
Prudent man rule
Prudent man rule
No limit on amount
Corp. bonds auth.
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Corp. bonds auth. 
None
Corp. bonds auth. 
of total fund assets.
and Penn.
Fig. 4 .— Summary of State Investment Regulations
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The unique requirements of trust funds were recog­
nized in the studies noted earlier (footnotes 4, 5» 6 * and 7 ) 
as well as the many studies by other states. First, they are 
essentially long term investors so that they do not have to 
concern themselves with short term market fluctuations. In 
addition trust funds have fairly predictable expenditure 
requirements. Finally, since the retirement trusts are set 
up on an actuarial basis, the added benefits or reduced costs 
which can be achieved by increasing returns can be calculated.
The lead in liberalization of investment policies 
was begun by the private pension funds and insurance companies. 
How the percent of these funds invested in common stock has 
grown over the past 10 years is shown in Figure 5 * The assets 
of these funds increased from just over 30 billion in i960 to 
well over 90 billion in 1970. At the same time the percentage 
of the funds invested in common stock increased from 32 per­
cent to 53 percent. The dollar amount of investments in common 
stock amounted to approximately 50 billion.
In order to fully understand the investment environ­
ment of trust funds, the different types of risk must be under­
stood. Business risk is the risk that the firm in which the 
investment is made may go bankrupt. In this respect, common 
stock is more risky than bonds since the bonds have first 
claim on a bankrupt corporation. Business risk, however, is 
no longer a very realistic one when considering equities rated 
A or better by one of the major rating agencies. Adequate div­
ersification further reduces this risk to an almost negligible
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amount. The most significant risk for pension funds and 
other trusts is thus the purchasing power or inflationary 
risk. This risk is usually overlooked by institutional 
investors, particularly the nonprofessional investors and 
legislators who make the regulations for the investment of 
government funds.
That the risk of inflation is in fact a very real 
concern for the investor, particularly over the long term, 
is shown in Figure 6. The value of the dollar declined an 
average of 5 -8 percent the past few years. Thus, a fund 
whose income was not at least 6 percent was actually declin­
ing in real value. For example, the Teachers' Retirement 
Fund reported earnings of 5 *^ percent for I969. As shown in 
Figure 7 , the value of the dollar during I969 decreased by 
over 6 percent. Thus the value of the assets of the fund 
actually decreased. All fixed income securities are suscep­
tible to this risk of inflation and to hedge against such 
risks, the purchase of common stocks represent the best 
guarantee. In terms of long-run investing, there is little 
doubt that the risk of inflation is more costly than the risk 
of a highly rated company going bankrupt.
One other type of risk that should be understood 
although it is not as important a consideration in the United 
States as it is in some other countries, is the political risk. 
This type of risk includes that of political insurrection but 
should more realistically relate to potential interference of
39
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of the government in steering investment in a particular direc­
tion. Our past experiences, however, indicate that this inter­
ference is of relatively short term. Thus since pension and 
trust funds are long term investments, they are not affected 
to any great degree. Again, it is also assumed that only 
high grade securities are to be selected.
Perhaps managers of public pension and trust funds 
have not been as quick to recognize the importance of the risk 
of inflation as private funds have been because of the guaran­
teed characteristic of the public funds. In this respect, any 
revenues which the public funds fail to earn because of their 
more restrictive regulations can be made up through govern­
ment subsidization. Few private funds can rely on their cor­
porate sponsors to help out if they fail to obtain the highest 
possible yield on their investments. Thus, private funds have 
a much greater percent of their assets invested in common stock 
than public funds. The amount of money along with the percent­
age of their assets that private funds have in common stock as 
of 1970 is shown in Figure 5 * Their investment in common stock 
totaled about 50 billion dollars or 53 percent of fund assets.
The private fund's managers appear to be paying more 
attention to the work done by researchers in the area of trust 
fund investment than the public fund's managers. In one such 
study made by the University of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business, it was determined that "over the 35 year period I926- 
1960, the rates of return (income plus appreciation) compounded
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annually on all common stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange was 9*01 p e r c e n t . T h i s  return was relatively 
high as indicated by Figures 7 and 8. No attempt was made 
to determine a percentage growth as was done in the University 
of Chicago study. Although the rapid rate of growth of the 
early I960*s has slowed, most predictions are for continued 
growth in the future.
The return on common stock can be compared with the 
other returns available as shown in Figures 9 » 10 and 1 1.
It is indicated in the following graphs that the yields on 
fixed income securities increased sharply since 19&7 due in 
part to the high inflation the country was undergoing. During 
this period, it is possible that the yield on these fixed 
income securities, particularly the corporate bonds, approached 
the yield potential on common stock. It is not likely, however 
that the high rate of inflation experienced since 19&7 will 
continue for long. It is more probable that in the future the 
interest rates on this type security will continue to decline 
as it has during the past few quarters.
A definite comparison is given between the returns 
of private pension funds with the heavier investment in common 
stock and public pension funds in another study conducted by 
Dr. Murray Polakoff in I966. The results of that study, as 
shown in Table 8, indicate that for 5 of the 7 years studied, 
private funds had a higher return than public funds.
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TABLE 8
A COMPARISON BETWEEN PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC PENSION FUND RETURNS
Year
Public Pension 
Fund Returns
Private Pension 
Fund Returns
1958 4 .6# 11.8#
1959 (0.9) 4.9
i960 9.7 5.7
1961 2 .0 1 1 .8
1962 4 .2 (2.9)
1963 2 .8 9.4
1964 3.9 8.5
Source : Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan­
cial Analysts Journal (May-June, 1 9 66), p. 7 9.
In addition to these academic studies done in equity 
investment for trust funds, numerous state and local govern­
ments have done studies on the return on investment in common 
stock. Many of these studies were presented in the 1964 
Montana Legislative report on investments and can be aptly 
summarized by the following statement. "One may assert that 
perhaps without exception the liberalization of state laws 
to entrust the investment administration of public trust funds 
to professional direction and to broaden the range of permis­
sive investment media to include, inter alia, FHA-guaranteed 
mortgages, corporate bonds, and common stocks, has led to 
substantial improvement in the production of income from 
such funds.
11Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair­
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 39,
The evidence is thus overwhelmingly in favor of 
liberalizing investment authorizations to include the pur­
chase of common stock. In terms of risk, the only really 
significant difference between bonds and the common stock 
of high-grade corporation is in the possible short-term 
fluctuation of the market price. "However, public pension 
funds by their very nature are long-term investors who, in 
the past and, for the foreseeable future, have no short-run
or unpredictable needs for funds that would be imperiled by
12a temporary decline in returns or falling market values."
"In the management of pension funds, their productivity 
(dividend yield and capital appreciation) should be the
1 3primary objective, completely overshadowing all others." 
Montana must follow the lead of over 80 percent of the other 
states in allowing equity purchases.
Further Considerations
The recommendations in this section concern the 
need to restrict investment in municipal bonds unless the 
yield is equal to or higher than the obtainable yield in 
some other authorized security, the need to consider the 
cost of researching and maintaining a portfolio of mortgages 
in considering their value to a portfolio, and the need to
^^Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan­
cial Analysts Journal (May-June, I966), p. 8 0.
^^Paul L. Howell, "Pension Funds and the Capital 
Market," The Journal of Finance (May, 1958), p. 2 6 2.
48
keep politics out of the public investment decision. If not 
considered, these problem areas could again cuase lower yields 
than necessary. Furthermore, there is evidence that each of 
these problems is either present today, or has been present 
recently in the state's investment environment.
The Case Against Municipals
The best argument against inclusion of municipal 
bonds in the portfolio of public pension funds can be illus­
trated by Figure 1 2. Although the utility bond yields do 
not represent all corporate bonds, they are an indication of 
the yield differentials between municipal bonds and the yields 
available through other investment media. In addition, there 
has been criticism in the past over the purchase of municipals 
by state funds because it was felt the trust funds were allow­
ing the municipals to be floated at a lower rate than the
14market would otherwise require. This problem was not felt 
to exist when the Montana Legislative Council made its report 
on investments in 1 964. The report indicated that a profit 
had been made by most of the funds when their holdings of 
municipals were liquidated.
14Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the 
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair­
man, (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1964), p. 29.
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On the other hand, the main argument in favor of 
investing public funds in municipals is that such investment 
benefits the people of the state in general. This attitude 
may still be held by some of the people who are eligible to 
sit on the State Investment Board. For this reason, the 
fallacy of this argument should be understood. "The notion 
of aiding economic activity...by concentrating investment 
within the state is clearly inappropriate and could be con­
sidered a breach of t r u s t . T h e  trust and pension funds 
have been set up for the specific benefit of the members of 
these systems, not for the benefit of all Montanans. Further­
more, as has already been pointed out, higher returns can 
mean lower taxes, a situation which does benefit all people 
concerned.
Fortunately, all municipal bond holdings have been 
liquidated in favor of higher yielding securities. The Trust 
and Legacy Fund sold the last municipals that were held by 
any state fund in 1 970. In order to maintain the best interest 
of the individuals relying on the returns from these funds, 
the only time in the future that municipals should be con­
sidered is when their yield is equal to or greater than the 
yield that could be obtained on any other security. There is 
little likelihood that this situation will ever occur. Thus, 
the state should realize that municipal securities are designed 
for taxpaying individuals or funds.
15Ibid.
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Mortgage Investments
Mortgage investments should be considered in the 
same manner as any other investment decision, obtaining the 
highest yield commensurate with reasonable safety. In recent 
years, public funds have increased their investments in mort­
gages significantly as yields on these securities increased 
even though there is a considerably higher cost in servicing 
mortgage investments than in servicing stock or bond port­
folios. This is one of the greatest mistakes made by public 
trust and pension funds, i.e., not considering the higher 
cost of mortgages in determining the highest yield. Thus, 
in many cases, due to the high cost of servicing, a mortgage 
portfolio does not yield as high a return as a comparable 
corporate bond and certainly not as high as equities.
Mortgages did offer a higher return than most other 
fixed income securities until quite recently. Now, however, 
the yield on grade A or higher corporates is comparable.
One problem that makes a specific analysis difficult is the 
fact that VA and FHA loans have a fixed interest charge but 
the points which must be paid when dealing in mortgages varies. 
This means that the actual yield would be increased or de­
creased by varying amounts depending on the time or the loca­
tion where the mortgage is purchased. In addition there is 
no easy way to find out what the point spreads are in various 
places. Thus, one seldom knows whether or not he is obtaining 
the highest yield obtainable in the mortgage market.
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The recommendation is, therefore, that the invest­
ment in mortgages should not be pursued as actively as has 
been done in the past unless the yield on them, including 
the cost of servicing the portfolio, is higher than can be 
obtained elsewhere. Generally, this policy would limit the 
investment in mortgages. Since there is no easy way to rate 
a mortgage investment as to quality the risks could be eval­
uated only in terms of the guarantee feature which is seldom 
100 percent of the mortgage. At the present time, higher 
yields can be obtained in the areas of equities and corporate 
bonds.
Investments and Politics
The final consideration concerns the need to keep 
politics out of pension fund investment decisions. This 
simply means that the only consideration in making an invest­
ment other than reasonable safety is obtaining the highest 
available return over the life of the investment at the time 
the investment is made. To be precise, any time an invest­
ment decision is made because of political considerations, a 
breach of trust has occurred.
In addition, the managing of the state's investments 
should not be a topic for continual political debate. This 
second-guessing by nonprofessionals usually tends to inhibit 
the effective operation of the investment function. The deci­
sions of the investment manager should not be continually 
subjected to question.
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The investment manager should be responsible to the 
people whose funds he invests and ultimately to the governor, 
but as a member of the governor's staff, he should not have 
to worry about the reaction of any members of the legislative 
branch to his actions.
Summary
In this chapter, a case has been presented for lib­
eralizing state investment regulations to allow state funds 
to be invested in common stock. If this authority had been 
granted in i960 when it was recommended, the state would have 
realized millions of dollars in increased returns during the 
past 10 years. "Rising wages, higher living costs,..., demand 
a more dynamic and productive investment policy for the huge
pension reserves which are now being accumulated for the pro-
1 Atection of the aged." Even though no one can predict that 
the future growth of common stocks will be as great as in the 
past, the ability to take advantage of this growth should be 
given.
Several other considerations to be aware of in the 
investment of public funds were also pointed out. These in­
cluded restricting investment in municipal bonds, mortgages, 
and politically motivated investments. Failing to pay atten­
tion to these problems could easily lead to diminished returns.
^^Paul L. Howell, "Common Stocks and Pension Fund 
Investing," Harvard Business Review (Nov. 1 9 58)» p. 9 3*
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The need for more up-to-date regulation of the 
State's investment policies and more aggressive management 
of the investment program has been demonstrated. An intro­
duction to the problem was presented in Chapter I. The fact 
that Montana has been slower to act than most other states is 
to the discredit of the legislative assembly. Most other 
states have encountered similar problems, but have had the 
foresight to change regulations and hire professional invest­
ment managers. The statutory background and past performance 
of the three funds was presented in Chapter II. The past per­
formance of these funds indicates that yields could have been 
significantly increased through investment in common stock 
and through better selection of securities currently author­
ized for investment by state regulations.
A summary of past studies of the investment of state 
funds in Montana was presented in Chapter III. The same pro­
blems that were prevalent throughout the 6 0's were recognized 
at least as early as i960 and recommendations for improvements 
were made. Unfortunately no action was forthcoming until 
August of I97I' The establishment of a State Investments 
Board, however, only can correct a portion of the problem,
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that of professional management and centralized record keeping. 
The legislature must act to establish more realistic invest­
ment regulations and should provide guidance to an investments 
officer for selecting the highest yielding securities avail­
able at the time purchases are made. In this way, the entire 
problem of lower than desirable yields may be eliminated.
The recommendations for improving the yield on the 
state's investments was presented in Chapter IV. The most 
important change that needs to be made is to authorize invest­
ment in common stock. Failure to do this has cost millions 
of dollars in lost revenues, and while there is no guarantee 
that the market will continue to grow aS it has in the past, 
most evidence supports the thesis that over the long-run, 
common stock yields will exceed fixed income yields. The 
evidence supporting this recommendation comes from profes­
sional investment managers, educational researchers, and other 
state legislative studies. The evidence is virtually unan­
imous that investment in common stock increases the overall 
yield including both dividend and appreciation. It was also 
pointed out in this chapter that failing to consider all of 
the costs in servicing mortgages could lead to selecting less 
than the best yielding securities. In addition, it is dif­
ficult to compute a yield for mortgages since no statement 
of discounts or premiums paid for the mortgage is given. 
Finally, the need to keep politics out of the investment 
process was stated. Making an investment decision based on
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anything other than economic considerations, i.e., is this 
the highest yielding security available at the time, should 
be considered a breach of trust.
In conclusion, therefore, a plea must be made for 
a suggested change in the state constitution and statutes to 
allow a broader range of investments by the state investment 
officer and include common stock authorization. In addition, 
guidance should be provided for the investment officer to 
select only the highest yielding securities available when 
making an investment decision. Only in this way can the 
maximizing of return to the people take place.
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